Drawdowns (loss from the last local maximum to the next local minimum) are essential aspects of risk assessment in investment management. They offer a more natural measure of real market risks than the variance or other cumulants of daily (or some other fixed time scale) distributions of returns. Here, we extend considerably our previous analysis by analyzing the major financial indices, the major currencies, gold, the twenty largest U.S. companies in terms of capitalisation as well as nine others chosen randomly. We find for the major financial markets that approximately 98% of the distributions of drawdowns is well-represented by an exponential (or a minor modification of it with a slightly fatter tail), while the largest to the few ten largest drawdowns are occurring with a significantly larger rate than predicted by the exponential: the largest drops thus constitute genuine outliers. This is confirmed by extensive testing on surrogate data, which unambiguously show that large stock market drops (and crashes) cannot be accounted for by the distribution of returns characterising the smaller market moves. They thus belong to a different class of their own and call for a specific amplification mechanism. A similar scenario is found for the majority of the company stocks analysed. Drawups (gain from the last local minimum to the next local maximum) exhibit a similar behavior in only about half the markets that we examined. In the spirit of Bacon in Novum Organum about 400 years ago, "Errors of Nature, Sports and Monsters correct the understanding in regard to ordinary things, and reveal general forms. For whoever knows the ways of Nature will more easily notice her deviations; and, on the other hand, whoever knows her deviations will more accurately describe her ways," we propose that outliers reveal fundamental properties of the stock market.
Introduction
It is now quite universally accepted that the distribution of asset returns is not only leptokurtotic but belongs to the class of fat tailed distributions. More formally, it has been shown that the tails of the distribution of returns follow approximately a power law P (return > x) ∼ C/x µ , with estimates of the 'tail index' µ falling in the range 2 to 4 (cf. de Vries, 1994; Lux, 1996; Pagan, 1996; Guillaume et al., 1997; Gopikrishnan et al., 1998) . This implies that the second and probably the third moment of the distribution are finite. Extrapolating this distribution to infinite values, the fourth and higher moments are predicted to be mathematically infinite. This approximate law seems to hold for returns calculated over time scales ranging from a few minutes to about three weeks while the distributions are consistent with a slow convergence to Gaussian behavior at larger time scales (Gopikrishnan et al., 1998; Plerou et al., 1999 ). An alternative description with finite moments of all orders but still with fat tails has been suggested in terms of stretched exponential, also known as sub-exponential or Weibull (with exponent less than one) distributions (Laherrère and Sornette, 1998) .
This "one-point" statistics is however far from sufficient for characterizing market moves (Campbell et al., 1997; Lo and MacKinlay, 1999) . Two-point statistics, such as correlations of price returns and of volatilities (with the persistence phenomenon modeled by ARCH processes and its generalizations) offers important and complementary but still limited informations. In principle, one would like to have access to the full hierarchy of multiple-point correlations functions, but this is not attainable in practice due to finite statistics. A shortcut is to realize that using a fixed time scale, such as daily returns, is not adapted to the real dynamics of price moves and that relatively low-order statistics with suitable adjustments to the relevant time scales of the market may be more efficient descriptions. Indeed, physical time is probably not the proper quantity to characterize the flow of information and the rhythm of trading. Clark (1973) first noticed that subordinated processes, in which time is itself a stochastic process, provide a natural mechanism for fat tails resulting from the fact that the distribution of increments of subordinate random walks is a mixture of normal distributions (which is generically leptokurtic). A possible candidate for the stochastic time process (the subordinator) is the transaction volume (Clark, 1973) or the number of trades (Geman and Ané, 1996) . These processes can be generalized into multifractal subordinated processes (Mandelbrot, 1997) . In a similar vain, Müller et al. (1995) , Guillaume et al. (1995) and Dacorogna et al. (1996) have advocated the concept of an elastic time that expands periods of high volatility and contracts those of low volatility, thus capturing better the relative importance of events on the market. Related empirical works have shown that return volatilities exhibit long-range correlations organized in a hierarchical way, from large time scales to small time scales [Ghashghaie et al, 1996; Dacorogna et al., 1998; Arneodo et al., 1998; Ballocchi et al., 1999; Muzy et al., 2000; Breymann et al., 2000] . All these approaches suggest that a fixed time scale is not adequate for capturing the perception of risk and return experienced by traders and investors. There is thus a large potential gain in being time-adaptive rather than rigid in order to gain insight into the dynamics of financial markets.
One such simple measure that we will focus upon here is the statistics of drawdowns (and their complement, the drawups). We define a drawdown as a persistent decrease in the price (specifically the closing price) over consecutive days. A drawdown is thus the cumulative loss from the last maximum to the next minimum of the price. Drawdowns are highly relevant: they measure directly the cumulative loss that an investment can incur. They also quantify the worst case scenario of an investor buying at the local high and selling at the next minimum. It is thus worthwhile to ask if there is any structure in the distribution of drawdowns. Notice that drawdowns embody a subtle dependence since they are constructed from runs of the same sign variations. They are not defined over a fixed time scale. Some drawdowns will last only one day, other five days or more. Their distribution measures how successive drops can influence each other and construct a persistent process, not captured by the distribution of returns nor by the two-point correlation function. In Appendix A, we show that independent daily price variations predict that the distribution of drawdowns has an asymptotic exponential tail while the body of the distribution is Gaussian (Mood, 1940) . Since the exponential distribution has a much fatter tail that the Gaussian law, we shall take the exponential law as our null hypothesis: tails fatter than the exponential law are a fortiori fatter than the Gaussian law.
To see how subtle dependences in successive price variations are measured by drawdowns, consider the simple but illustrative toy model in which the price increments δp(t) are given by (Robinson, 1979; Hsieh, 1989) δp(t) = ǫ(t) + ǫ(t − 1)ǫ(t − 2) ,
where ǫ(t) is a white noise process with zero mean and unit variance. Then, the expectation E(δp(t)) as well as the two-point correlation E(δp(t)δp(t ′ )) for t = t ′ are zero and δp(t) is also a white noise process. However, the three-point correlation function E(δp(t − 2)δp(t − 1)δp(t)) is non-zero and equal to 1 and the expectation of δp(t) conditioned on the knowledge of the two previous increments δp(t − 2) and δp(t − 1) is non-zero and equal to E(δp(t)|δp(t − 2),
showing a clear predictive power. This leads to a very distinct signature in the distribution of drawdowns. To simplify the analysis to the extreme and make the message very clear, let us restrict to the case where ǫ(t) can only take two values ±1, Then, δp(t) can take only three values 0 and ±2 with the correspondance
where the left colum gives the three consecutive values ǫ(t − 2), ǫ(t − 1), ǫ(t) and the right column is the corresponding price increment δp(t). We see directly by this explicit construction that δp(t) is a white noise process. However, there is a clear predictability and the distribution of drawdowns reflects it: there are no drawdowns of duration larger than two time steps. Indeed, the worst possible drawdown corresponds to the following sequence for ǫ: − − + − −. This corresponds to the sequence of price increments +2, −2, −2, which is either stoped by a +2 if the next ǫ is + or by a sequence of 0's interupted by a +2 at the first ǫ = +. While the drawdowns of the process ǫ(t) can in principle be of infinite duration, the drawdowns of p(t) cannot. This shows that the structure of the process δp(t) defined by (1) has a dramatic signature in the distribution of drawdowns in p(t). This illustrates that drawdowns, rather than daily or weekly returns or any other fixed time scale returns, are more adequate time-elastic measures of price moves.
There is not a unique definition of drawdowns as there are several possible choices for the peak where the drawdown starts and is initiated. For instance, the "current drawdown" is the amount in percent that a portfolio has declined from its most recent peak. The maximum drawdown is the largest amount (in percent) that a fund or portfolio dropped from a peak over its lifetime. Grossman and Zhou (1993) analyze the optimal risky investment for an investor not willing to lose at each point in time a drawdown (calculated relative to the highest value of the asset in the past) larger than a fixed percentage of the maximum value his wealth has achieved up to that time. Maslov and Zhang (1999) have investigated the distribution of "drawdowns from the maximum", where the drawdowns are also calculated relative to the highest value of the asset in the past. This distribution is defined only for an asset exhibiting a long-term upward trend and can be shown, for uncorrelated returns, to lead to power law distributions. In this paper, drawdowns will be defined as the decrease in percent from a local maximum to the following local minimum after which the price again increases.
To summarize, our emphasis on drawdowns is motivated by two considerations: 1) drawdowns are important measures of risks used by practitioners because they represent their cumulative loss since the last estimation of their wealth. It is indeed a common psychological trait of people to estimate a loss by comparison with the latest maximum wealth; 2) drawdowns automatically capture an important part of the time dependence of price returns, similarly to the so-called run-statistics often used in statistical testing (Knuth, 1969) and econometrics (Campbell et al., 1997; Barber and Lyon, 1997) . As we have previously showed (Johansen and Sornette, 1998; 2000b) , the distribution of drawdowns contains an information which is quite different from the distribution of returns over a fixed time scale. In particular, a drawndown embodies the interplay between a series of losses and hence measures the "memory" of the market. Drawdowns will examplify the effect of correlations in price variations when they appear, which must be taken into account for a correct characterisation of market price variations. They are direct measure of a possible amplification or "flight of fear" where previous losses lead to further selling, strengthening the downward trend, occasionally ending in a crash. We stress that drawdowns, by the "elastic" time-scale used to define them, are effectively function of several higher order correlations at the same time.
The data used in our work comprises These different data have not the same time span, largely due to different lifespan, especially for some recent "new technology" companies. In this selection of time series, we are far from exhaustive but have a reasonable sample for our purpose: as we shall see, with the exception of the index CAC40 (the "French exception"?), all time series 1-3 exhibit clear outlier drawdowns. This suggests that outliers constitute an ubiquitous feature of stock markets, independently of their nature. In the next section 2, we present our results for the drawdowns of the major world financial markets and the major US companies. While it is well-known that price returns are essentially uncorrelated, section 2 will show that strong correlations do appear at time special times when large drawdowns occurs: the distribution of large drawdowns is strongly non-exponential with a much fatter tail. Since this anomalous behavior is observed only for the largest drawdowns, in some cases up to a few tens of the largest drawdowns, these very large drawdowns can thus be considered to be outliers because they do not conform to the model suggested by the main part of the data. This points to the brief appearence of a dependence in successive drops leading to an amplification which makes these drops special. The results confirm and extend our previous announcements (Johansen and Sornette, 1998; 2000b) .
Section 3 discusses our analysis performed with the same methodology on drawups, i.e. persistent increases in the price over consecutive days, measured as the cumulative gain from the last minimum to the next maximum of the price. Drawups are the complement structures of the drawdowns. The interest in looking at drawups is twofold. First, it is natural to investigate if there is an asymmetry in the distribution of large moves. Second, drawups become drawdowns for a trader invested with a short (selling) position. Since the number of short and long position are not symmetric with a large bias in favor of long positions, we expect and confirm that the distribution of drawups is significantly different from that of drawdowns. While drawups of amplitude larger than 15% occur about twice as often as drawdowns of the same amplitude, the case for the largest drawups to be outliers is less clear-cut. Half the time series have their largest drawups significantly larger than explained by the bulk of the distribution, the converse is observed for the other half. It thus seems that outlier drawups is a less conspicuous feature of financial series with more industry specificities than the ubiquitous outlier drawdowns observed essentially in all markets.
Drawdowns

Drawdowns in major financial indices
The distribution (16) given in Appendix A has been derived on the assumption that successive price variations are uncorrelated. There is a large body of evidence for the correctness of this assumption for the largest fraction of trading days (Campbell et al., 1997) . However, consider, for instance, the 14 largest drawdowns that has occurred in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in this century. Their characteristics are presented in table 1. Only 3 lasted one or two days, whereas 9 lasted four days or more. Let us examine in particular the largest drawdown. It started on Oct. 14, 1987 Oct. 14, (1987 in decimal years), lasted four days and led to a total loss of −30.7%. This crash is thus a run of four consecutive losses: first day the index is down with 3.8%, second day with 6.1%, third day with 10.4% and fourth with 30.7%. In terms of consecutive losses this correspond to 3.8%, 2.4, 4.6% and with 22.6% on what is known as the Black Monday of 19th Oct. 1987 .
The observation of large successive drops is suggestive of the existence of a transient correlation. To make this point clear, consider an hypothetical drawdown of 30% made up of three successive drops of 10% each. A daily loss of 10%, while severe, is not that uncommon and occurs typically once every four years (or one in about 1000 trading days). It thus corresponds to a probability of 10 −3 . Assuming that the three successive drops of 10% are uncorrelated, the probability of the drawdown of 30% is [10 −3 ] 3 = 10 −9 , i.e., corresponds to one even in four millions years, in other words the lack of correlations is impossible.
For the Dow Jones, this reasoning can be adapted as follows. We use a simple functional form for the distribution of daily losses, namely an exponential distribution with decay rate 1/0.63% obtained by a leastsquare fit. This quality of the exponential model is confirmed by the direct calculation of the average loss amplitude equal to 0.67% and of its standard deviation equal to 0.61% (recall that an exact exponential would give the three values exactly equal). Using these numerical values, the probability for a drop equal to or larger than 3.8% is exp(−3.8/0.63) = 2.4 10 −3 (an event occurring about once every two years); the probability for a drop equal to or larger than 2.4% is exp(−2.4/0.63) = 2.2 10 −2 (an event occurring about once every two months); the probability for a drop equal to or larger than 4.6% is exp(−4.6/0.63) = 6.7 10 −4 (an event occurring about once every six years); the probability for a drop equal to or larger than 22.6% is exp(−22.6/0.63) = 2.6 10 −16
(an event occurring about once every 10 14 years). All together, under the hypothesis that daily losses are uncorrelated from one day to the next, the sequence of four drops making the largest drawdown occurs with a probability 10 −23 , i.e., once in about 4 thousands of billions of billions years. This clearly suggests that the hypothesis of uncorrelated daily returns is to be rejected and that drawdowns and especially the large ones may exhibit intermittent correlations in the asset price time series.
Figures 1 to 3 show the cumulative distributions N c (x) of drawdowns in three major US indices: The Dow Jones Industrial Average, the SP500 and the Nasdaq Composite. The distributions are well-parameterized by a stretched exponential
up to drawdawns of ≈ 10%, where the distribution "breaks away" from the stretched exponential, most abruptly for the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the SP500. Both the Dow Jones Industrial Average and the Nasdaq Compositeshow a distinct upward curvature corresponding to z ≈ 0.82 ± 0.02, whereas the SP 500 is closer to a pure exponential with z ≈ 0.90, see table 2. Note that an exponent z < 1 corresponds to a fatter tail than an exponential. The law (4) is also known in the mathematical literature as a "sub-exponential" and in the engineering field as a Weibull distribution (see chap. 6 in (Sornette, 2000) for useful informations on this family of distributions and how to calibrate them). Our aim is not to defend the model (4) but rather to use it as a convenient and parsimonious tool. This family (4) is particularly adapted to our problem because it contains the null hypothesis (see Appendix A), namely the exponential distribution z = 1, as a particular case. Allowing z to depart from 1 then provides us a simple and robust measure of the deviation from an exponential. We find actually that even allowing for a fatter tail is not enough to account for the very largest drawdowns which wildly depart from this description. Playing the devil's advocate, one could argue that the strong departure from model (4) of the few largest drawdowns observed in figures 1 to 3 is not a proof of the existence of outliers, only of the inadequacy of the model (4). It is true that we can never prove the existence of outliers in an absolute sense. However, we have calculated a reasonable null-hypothesis, provided a family of distributions that extends the null-hypothesis to account for larger moves. Nevertheless, we find that the largest drawdowns are utterly different from the distribution containing approximately 98% of the data. We find this to be an important message which may lead to a better understanding of how the financial markets react in times of large losses. Is this behaviour confined to U.S. markets or is it a more general feature of stock market behavior. In order to answer this question, we have analysed the main stock market index of the remaining six G7-countries as well as that of Australia, Hong-Kong and Singapore. The results of this analysis is shown in figures 4 to 12 and more quantitatively in table 2. Quite remarkably, we find that all markets except the French market, the Japanese market being on the borderline 1 , show the same qualitative behaviour exhibiting outliers. The Paris stock exchange is the only exception as the distribution of drawdowns is an almost perfect exponential. It may be that the observation time used for CAC40 is not large enough for an outlier to have occurred. If we compare with the Milano stock market index MIBTel, we see that all the distribution except the single largest drawdown is also close to a pure exponential. The presence or absence of this outlier thus makes all the difference.
To quantify the statistical significance of the fluctuations obtained in the exponent z reported in table 2, we use the asymptotic covariance matrix of the estimated parameters, the typical scale χ ≡ 1/B 1/z and the exponent z calculated by Thoman et al. (1970) :
where N is the sample size (number of drawdowns in our data sets) and σ χ (resp. σ z ) is the standard deviation of χ (resp. z). The fluctuations in the exponent z are statistically significant: excluding the CAC40, we find an average z = 0.87 with a standard deviation of 0.04 which is about two times larger than expected from the statistics (6). These two expressions (5) and (6) are used to give the one-sigma error bars in the tables.
Drawdowns in gold and in currencies
To test whether the two outstanding observations obtained thus far, namely the existence of outliers beyond a stretched exponential regime, apply more generally, we now analyze currencies and gold. As seen in figure 13 for the US$/DM echange rate, figure 14 for the US$/YEN echange rate, figure 15 for the US$/CHF exchange rate and figure 16 for gold, a similar behavior is observed. The exponent z tends to be larger with a smaller characteristic drawdown χ (thinner tails) for currencies compared to the indices. The gold market and the currencies confirm strongly the previous evidence by providing us with some of the strongest cases together with the US indices, TSE 300, All Ordinaries, FTSE 100 and the DAX for the presence of outliers. Summarizing thus far, the results of the analysis of 12 different stock market indices, the exchange of the $US against three different major currencies as well as the gold market are that outliers as well as correlations between price returns are ubiquitous features of major financial markets. The success in using the stretched exponential for parameterising the data does not of course mean that better parametrizations cannot be found, neither does it prove that the processes governing the dynamics of the main part of the distribution is giving stretched exponential distributions. As we said above, its virtue lies in the fact that it is a straightforward generalisation of the pure exponential, which represents the simplest and natural null-hypothesis for uncorrelated price variations. It is important to stress that the stretched exponential model parameterizes ≈ 98% of all data points.
Drawdowns in the stock of major US companies
We now extend our analysis to the very largest companies in the U.S.A. in terms of capitalisation (market value). The ranking is that of Forbes at the beginning of the year 2000. We have chosen the top 20, and in addition a random sample of other companies, namely number 25 (Coca Cola), number 30 (Oualcomm), number 35 (Appl. Materials), number 39 (JDS Uniphase), number 46 (Am. Home Prod.) and number 50 (Medtronic). Three more companies have been added in order to get longer time series as well as representatives for the automobile sector. These are Procter & Gamble (number 38), General Motors (number 43) and Ford (number 64). This represent a non-biased selection based on objective criteria.
The results can be seen in figures 33 to 61 and table 4. From the figures, we can see that the distributions of the five largest companies (MicroSoft, Cisco, General Electric, Intel and Exxon-Mobil) clearly exhibits the same features as those for the major financial markets. Of the remaining 23, for all but America Online and JDS Uniphase, we find clear outliers but also a variety of different tails of the distributions. The main difference is in the value of the exponent z, which is ≈ 1 or larger. This means that the distributions tends to bend downward instead of upward, thus emphasising the appearance the outliers. It is interesting to note that the two companies, America Online and JDS Uniphase, whose distributions did not exhibit outliers are also the two companies with by far the largest number per year of drawdowns of amplitude above 15% (close to 4), see table 4.
Synthetic tests and statistical significance
To further establish the statistical confidence with which we can conclude that the largest drawdowns are outliers, for each financial time series, we have reshuffled the daily returns 1000 times and hence generated 1000 synthetic data sets for each. This procedure means that 1000 synthetic data will have exactly the same distribution of daily returns as each time series. However, higher order correlations apparently present in the largest drawdowns are destroyed by the reshuffling. This surrogate data analysis of the distribution of drawdowns has the advantage of being non-parametric, i.e., independent of the quality of fits with a model such as the stretched exponential.
In order to compare the distribution of drawdowns obtained for the real data and for the synthetic data for each of the indices, of the currencies and of companies named in the first column of tables 6 and 7, a threshold given by the second column has been chosen by identifying a "gap" in the distribution (the first point after the gap is then the smallest outlier and the threshold is the integer value of that drawdown). The third column gives the number of drawdowns above the threshold in the true data. The fourth column gives the number of surrogate data sets with 0, 1, 2, 3, ... drawdowns larger than the threshold. The last column quantifies the corresponding confidence level. Note that for AT&T, a crash of ≈ 73% occurred which is not shown in figure 42 . This is why the number of reported drawdowns larger that the threshold is 4 and not 3, as one would get only looking at the figure 42.
The results for the financial market indices, for the currencies and for gold exhibit a very high statistical confidence level about 99%. The situation is more dispersed for companies: out of the 25 companies, six (resp. fourteen) companies gives a confidence level higher than 98% (resp. 80%). We expect and preliminary results indicate that generalizing drawdowns to take into account short upward moves in an otherwise downward trend will enhance this statistical significance for the companies. This will be reported in a future work.
Synthesis of the analysis of financial drawdowns
Adding up the strength of the evidence provided by all these data sets, it is clear that the null-hypothesis of an uncorrelated price variations generating the drawdowns is rejected. The curvature observed in a semilogarithmic representation is unambiguous feature whether we observe the stock markets, the currency market, the gold market and the market of stocks of major US companies. As a straightforward generalisation of the null-hypothesis derived in the Appendix A, we have successfully used a stretched exponential to parameterize ≈ 98% of the distribution for all data sets. However, this stretched exponential model is absolutely unable to account for the extreme tails, constituted of events that we thus call "outliers". In fact, if one was to extrapolate the statistics of the overall part of the data to what we call outliers, their rate of occurrence would be exceedingly small for each single market. Summing up this observation on all markets, the concept that the largest drawdowns are outliers imposes itself as an evidence.
With respect to the stretched exponential model used to parameterize the bulk of the cumulative distribution of drawdowns, we clearly observe two families: the major financial indices (except the CAC40), gold and the exchange rates are characterized by z < 1 suggesting a weak correlation of daily returns building up the drawdowns, while the distribution of drawdowns of the large US companies are compatible with z ≈ 1 and thus exhibit no detectable correlations.
The exponential null-hypothesis provides another measure of the departure of the outliers from the bulk of the distribution. As shown in Appendix B, the typical fluctuations of the largest drawdowns are expected to be given by the expression (21): the expected fluctuations of the largest drawdowns observed in a finite sample of N events should thus be of the order of the typical drawdown size D 0 . Since D 0 is typically found of the order of a few percent at most and no more than about 6% for the "wilder" companies, the observed large values of the outliers above the extrapolation of the exponential fit by 10% up to about 20% is many times larger than the variations predicted by the exponential null-hypothesis.
Drawups
Now that we have established the essential statistics of drawdowns in major financial markets and the stocks of major US companies, we will consider the reverse phenomenon: drawups. As a drawdown was defined as the change (in percent) between a local maximum and the following minimum, a drawup is defined as the change (in percent) between a local minimum and the following maximum, i.e., a drawup is the event that follows the drawdown and vice versa.
Drawups in the major financial markets, on gold and the exchange rates
Figures 17 to 32 show the distribution of drawups for the markets considered in section 2.1 and 2.2. The results obtained for the drawups are not as clear-cut as for the drawdowns. Whereas the distributions for the Dow Jones Industrial Average , the SP 500 and the Gold market clearly exhibits a similar behavior to that of the drawdowns, this is not the case for the TSE 300, the Strait times, the Hang Seng, the FTSE 100, the DAX, the MIBTel and the $US/Yen exchange rate. The other markets are at the borderline of significance 2 . In the one case where we have sufficient statistics (for the Dow Jones Industrial Average ), we have successfully parameterized the tail of the distribution with another stretched exponential, see table 3. However, how to interpret the interpolation of such two rather excellent fits is difficult. With respect to the other markets that clearly exhibit outliers, it is impossible to give a qualified estimation of the distribution of the outliers due to the limited statistics just as with the drawdown . With respect to the fits with the stretched exponential, twelve markets have a value of the exponent z below 1 and only five have a value larger than 1: we thus note a clear bias towards a value for the exponent z < 1.
Drawups of the major US companies
For the drawups in the price of major US companies, the picture is less striking when compared the major financial markets. Again, a fraction of the companies exhibit a behavior similar to that of the major financial market. A clear-cut distinction is always difficult, but we find three groups according to the outlier criterion:
• Obvious outliers: General Electric, Intel, Exxon-Mobil, Oracle, Wall-Mart, IBM, HP, Sun Microsystems, SBC, Coca-Cola, Procter & Gamble and Medtronic.
• Difficult to classify in the first group : AT&T, Citigroup, Applied Materials and General Motors.
• Clearly no outliers: Microsoft, Cisco, Lucent, Texas Instrument, Merck, EMC, Pifzer, AOL, MCI WorldComm., Qualkomm, JDS Uniphase, American Home Products and Ford.
This means that 12 companies belong to the first catagory, 13 to the last and only 4 companies on the borderline. Hence, it is difficult to conclude with the same force as for the drawdowns about the existence of outliers. The concept of large drawups as outliers seems however a persuasive feature of about half the markets. Another interesting observation is that the fits with the stretched exponential are consistent with a value for the exponent z ≈ 1 (albeit with significant fluctuations from market to market), in agreement with the null hypothesis. The two observations may be related. Again, it is interesting to observe that the two companies, America Online and JDS Uniphase, which have by far the highest rate of drawdowns above 15% also have by far the highest rate of drawups above 15%, as shown in table 5. In fact, this ranking holds approximately for most of the companies. Figure 91 shows the number of draw ups of amplitude larger than 15% as a function of the number of draw downs larger than 15% for all the companies analyzed here and shown respectively in tables 5 and 4. The linear regression is good with a R-statistics of 0.97 and a correlation coefficient of 0.62. In the linear regression, we have allowed the value M 1 at the origin to be non-zero. However, the fit finds M 1 to have a negligible value: vanishing draw downs come with vanishing draw ups.
Synthesis of the analysis of financial drawups
As previously said, the outlier concept is not as overwhelmingly convincing for the drawups as it was found for the drawdowns. Whereas there can be little doubt about the validity of the concept for the Dow Jones Industrial Average , the S&P 500, the CAC 40 and the Gold price, the results are less clear-cut for the other markets. Another good candidate exhibiting strong outliers is the All Ordinaries, with its downward bend in the tail. However, overall the conclusion is that the similarity between different markets found with respect to drawdown does not carry over as straightforwardly to the drawups. With respect to the major US companies, we see a similar picture with approximately half of them exhibiting outliers and approximately the other half with no outliers. Comparing with the results for the drawdown , we are tempted to conjecture that drawdowns are generic events whereas drawups are much more sensitive to markets and industrial sectors.
There is another important difference between drawups and drawdowns. Taking 15% as a typical amplitude for what can be called "large" drawups and drawdowns (see all the figures where 15% is seen to be approximately the value of the cross-over from the bulk of the distributions to the outlier regime), we find that there are on average 0.94 drawdowns per year of amplitude equal to or larger than 15%, compared to 1.92 drawups per year of amplitude equal to or larger than 15%. Thus, a drawup larger than 15% is twice as likely to happen as a drawdown larger than 15%, which means that large drawups are twice as frequent and thus to a much lesser extent to be characterised as outliers. The difference cannot be attributed to a difference in the size of the two sets. We attribute it to the very different value attributed to them by the market: drawups are cheered upon by the market and the media, whereas drawdowns are not appreciated 3 . Hence, both from the point of view of risk management and of market psychology, there is a strong asymmetry between drawups and drawdowns.
Summary and Conclusion
This paper has investigated the distribution of drawdowns defined as losses from the last local maximum to the next local minimum and of drawups defined as gains from the last local minimum to the next maximum. Drawdowns are particularly interesting because they provide a more natural measure of real market risks than the variance or other cumulants of daily (or other fixed time scale) distributions of returns. The analyzed time series consist in most of the major world financial indices, the major currencies, gold and the twenty largest U.S. companies in terms of capitalisation. We have found the following facts.
1. Large drawups of more than 15% occur approximately twice as often as large drawdowns of similar amplitudes.
2. The bulk (98%) of the drawdowns and drawups are very well-fitted by the exponential null-hypothesis (based on the assumption of independent price variations) or by a slight generalization called the stretched exponential model ∝ exp(−|x/χ| z ).
3. The typical scale χ and the exponent z provide two useful measures of the size of drawdowns and their rate of occurrence: the larger χ is, the larger are the drawdowns and drawups. The smaller z is, the fatter is the tail of the distribution controlling large fluctuations.
4. As expected, currencies have the smallest typical fluctuations both for drawdowns and drawups measured by χ = 0.79 − 1.29% but have relatively fat tails z = 0.84 − 0.91. For indices, fluctuations are larger with χ = 1.05 − 2.1% with z for drawdowns in the same range as the currencies (except CAC40 which is compatible with a pure exponential z = 1). In constrast, drawups have the same range of χ but their exponents are larger and are compatible with z = 1. Companies have much larger drawdowns in general with χ = 1.91−7.61%. The exponents z are compatible with the null-hypothesis z = 1 both for drawdowns and drawups.
5. The remaining 1 − 2% of the largest drawdowns are not at all explained by the exponential null-hypothesis or its extension in terms of the stretched exponential. Large drawdowns up to three times larger than expected from the null-hypothesis are found to be ubiquitous occurrences of essentially all the times series that we have investigated, the only noticeable exception being the French index CAC40. We term "outliers" these anomalous drawdowns.
6. About half of the time series show outliers for the drawups. The drawups are thus different statistically from the drawdowns and constitute a less conspicuous structure of financial markets.
The most important result is the demonstration that the very largest drawdowns are outliers. This is true notwithstanding the fact that the very largest daily drops are not outliers, most of the time. Therefore, the anomalously large amplitude of the drawdowns can only be explained by invoking the emergence of rare but sudden persistences of successive daily drops, with in addition correlated amplification of the drops. Why such successions of correlated daily moves occur is a very important question with consequences for portfolio management and systemic risk, to cite only two applications. In previous works, we have argued that the very largest drawdowns, the financial crashes, are the collapse of speculative bubbles and result from specific imitation and speculative behavior. A model with a mixture of rational agents and noisy imitative traders accounts for the stylized observations associated with crashes (Johansen and Sornette, 1999a,b; 2000a) . In this model, the outlier crashes are indeed understood as special events corresponding to the sudden burst of a bubble.
In future works, it will be interesting to examine the variations of the statistics of drawdowns, of drawups, of the typical scale χ and of the exponent z in different parts of the industry to investigate whether industry specificities may lead to characteristic structures for the drawdowns, for the existence, size and rate of outliers.
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Appendix A: exponential null-hypothesis for the distribution of drawdowns
Consider the simplest and most straightforward definition of a drawdown, namely the loss in percent from a maximum to the following minimum. For instance, if the signs of returns over 12 consecutive days are + + − − + − + − − − −+, the first drawdown lasts two days, the second drawdown lasts one day and the third one lasts four days. With this definition and under the null hypothesis of uncorrelated consecutive price returns, the probability P (D) to observe a drawdown of a given magnitude D is
where
is the probability to observe a positive price variation and the term p + /p − ensure the normalization of P (D). The sum over n in the r.h.s. of (7) is over all possible run lengths n of consecutive losses that sum up to a given D. Taking the Fourier transform of (7) gives the expression of the characteristic functionP (k) obtained after the summation of the infinite series:P
Notice that P(k) is a modified characteristic function of p(x) truncated to negative price variations. Expression (9) can also be rewritten asP
where we have used the definition P(0) ≡ p − . We can expand (P(k) − P(0)) /P(k) for small k (corresponding to large |D|'s as
which together with (11) yieldsP
and
is the average price variation conditioned to be negative: in other word, it is the average size of the negative variations. The distribution whose characteristic function is (13) is nothing but the exponential function
where D 0 > 0 is the typical amplitude of the drawndown amplitude distribution. This derivation shows that the tail of the drawndown distribution defined as runs of negative returns is generically an exponential function. For approximately symmetric distributions of daily returns, p + = p − = 1/2. Formula (14) shows that the typical size D 0 of drawdowns is 4 times the average daily drop. We retrieve the same exponential distribution semi-quantitatively by considering that negative price variations are of a fixed size x − . Then, the probability to observe a drawdown of amplitude D = n x − is simply p + p n − , which gives (16) with a slightly modified estimation of the typical drawdown D 0 = − x − ln 1/p− . This exponential distribution (16) of "current drawdowns" should not be mistaken with the distribution of the maximum drawdowns defined as the largest depression from some arbitrary past price, which can also be shown to have an exponential tail with a typical value D 0 determined from the equation (Bouchaud and Potters, 1997; see Feller, 1971, p.402; Sornette and Cont, 1997 )
The exponential distribution (16) thus constitutes our null hypothesis. With respect to durations of drawdowns, we also expect them to be exponentially distributed from the assumed independence of signs of successive price variations. The probability that a drawdown lasts n consecutive days (i.e. is a run of length n) is p + p n − ∝ exp (n ln p − ). The typical duration of a drawdown is thus
Since most markets exhibit very weak asymmetries, the probability p − for a negative price variation is close to 1/2 leading to n 0 = 1/ ln 2 ≈ 1.44 days. The exponential distribution of the duration of drawdowns and the typical value (18) turns out to be in good agreement with our data analysis. A similar result has been first derived by von Mises (1921) who showed that the number of long runs of given length was approximately distributed according to the Poisson law for large samples. Mood (1940) has shown that the body of the distribution of run lengths is asymptotically Gaussian.
Appendix B: Confidence interval for large drawdowns distributed with for an exponential law
Let us consider the exponential distribution P (D) given by (16) and let us assume that we have observed N drawdowns. We would like to determine the typical amplitude of the fluctuations of these drawdowns, and especially the fluctuations of the largest ones. Here, we consider the absolute values or amplitudes of drawdowns and thus work with positive numbers. IWe rank them by descending values D 1 > D 2 > ... > D N and express the probability P (D n ) that the n-th rank D n takes a given value in the interval of width dD n :
The most probable n-th rank D * n maximizes P (D n ) and is given by
The half-width (defined as the deviation from D * n that halves P (D n )) is given by
for small ranks n << N , i.e. for the largest drawdowns. This result (21) shows that the expected fluctuations of the largest drawdowns observed in a finite sample of N events is of the order of the typical drawdown size D 0 . Since D 0 is typically found of the order of a few percent at most and no more than about 6% for the "wilder" companies, the observed large values of the outliers above the extrapolation of the exponential fit by 10% up to about 20% is many times larger than the variations predicted by the null-hypothesis. Number of draw ups of amplitude larger than 15% as a function of the number of draw downs of amplitude larger than 15% for all the companies analyzed here and shown respectively in tables 5 and 4. The linear regression is shown as the straight line and the parameters are given in the table within the figure. The correlation coefficient is 0.62. Table 2 : Parameter values obtained by fitting equation (4) to the cumulative distribution N c of drawdowns. In order to stabilise the fit, it has been performed as log(N c ) = log(A) − B|x| z , where A is the total number of drawdowns and hence fixed equivalent to a normalisation of the corresponding probability distribution. The characteristic scale χ is defined by χ = 1/B 1/z . DJ is the Dow Jones Industrial Average, S&P is the Standard and Poor 500 Index, Nasdaq is the Nasdaq Composite, TSE 300 Composite is the index of the stock exchange of Toronto, Canada, All Ordinaries is that of Sydney stock exchange, Australia, Straits Times is that of Singapore stock exchange, Hang Seng is that of Hong Kong stock exchange, Nikkei 225 is that of Tokyo stock exchange, Japan, FTSE 100 is that of London stock exchange, U.K., CAC 40 is that of Paris stock exchange, France, Dax is that of Frankfurt stock exchange, Germany and MIBTel is that of Milan stock exchange. The error bars reported for χ and z are obtained from the formulas (5) and (6). (4) to the cumulative distribution N c of drawdowns. In order to stabilise the fit, it has been performed as log(N c ) = log(A) − B|x| z , where A is the total number of drawdowns and hence fixed equivalent to a normalisation of the corresponding probability distribution. The companies are the top 20 in terms of market value, number 25, number 30, number 35, number 39 (no data for number 40 could be optained), number 46 (no data for number 45 could be optained) and number 50. Three more companies have been added in order to get longer time series as well as representatives for the automobil sector. (4) to the cumulative distribution N c of drawups. In order to stabilise the fit, it has been performed as log(N c ) = log(A)−B|x| z , where A is the total number of drawups and hence fixed equivalent to a normalisation of the corresponding probability distribution. The characteristic scale χ is defined by χ = 1/B 1/z . The companies are the top 20 in terms of market value, number 25, number 30, number 35, number 39 (no data for number 40 could be optained), number 46 (no data for number 45 could be optained) and number 50. Three more companies have been added in order to get longer time series as well as representatives for the automobil sector. These are Procter & Gamble (number 38), General Motors (number 43) and Ford (number 64). The ranking is Forbes of year 2000. The error bars reported for χ and z are obtained from the formulas (5) and (6). Table 6 : For each of the indices and currencies named in the first column, a threshold given by the second column has been chosen by identifying a "gap" in the distribution (the first point after the gap is then the smallest outlier and the threshold is the integer value of that drawdown). The third column gives the number of drawdowns above the threshold in the true data. The fourth column gives the number of surrogate data sets with 0, 1, 2, 3, ... drawdowns larger than the threshold. The last column quantifies the corresponding confidence level.
